We study the economics of sharing credit with employees, using the U.S. mutual fund industry as our testing ground. Between 1993 and, the share of funds that disclosed manager names to their investors fell significantly. We hypothesize that the choice between named and anonymous management reflects a tradeoff between the marketing and incentive benefits of naming managers and the costs associated with increased ex-post bargaining power. Consistent with this tradeoff, we find that funds with named managers receive more positive media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion, but that departures of named managers reduce inflows, especially for funds with strong past performance. To the extent that the hedge fund boom differentially increased outside opportunities for successful named managers, we predict that it should have increased the costs associated with naming managers and led to more anonymous management. Indeed, we find that the shift towards anonymous management is greater in those asset classes and geographical areas with more hedge fund activity.
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Mutual fund firms have traditionally chosen to identify a specific individual as the manager of each fund.
For example, Peter Lynch is best known as the manager of Fidelity's Magellan fund. In 1993, over 70% of U.S. mutual funds had a single named manager, but since then funds have increasingly disclosed either multiple manager names or that the fund is "team managed" without naming any specific managers. The incidence of anonymous management has increased from 82 funds (4% of the sample) in 1993 to 905 funds (18%) in 2004 (Table 1) . 1 The use of anonymous management by mutual funds raises a more general question about contracting between firms and their employees: when should firms commit to share credit for project outcomes with their employees? We view the firm's decision about whether to share credit as, fundamentally, a decision about who will own the project's track record. As with many employee contracting choices, sharing credit should involve a tradeoff between increasing joint surplus and sharing rents with employees. Specifically, sharing credit should increase the bargaining power of employees who are successful. This prospect should help motivate (Holmström, 1999) and attract better employees, but at a cost to the firm, since it is unlikely that the full expected value of these future rents can be extracted from the employee upfront.
We build on this traditional tradeoff, by adding the hypothesis that sharing credit with employees may also generate marketing. Past work suggests that investors prefer brands with personalities (Aaker (1997)) and investments with plausible stories for why they should outperform (Barber, Heath, and Odean (2003) ; Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer (2006) ). This preference could be the result of either limited attention or a (rational or behavioral) anticipation of higher quality when a person associates himself with a product. When consumers have these preferences, sharing credit with employees creates product differentiation with the potential to both increase product demand and soften price competition.
In this paper, we exploit cross-sectional and time-series differences in mutual fund managerial anonymity to better understand the benefits and costs of sharing credit with employees. Managing a mutual fund involves a team of people.
2 Therefore, the mutual fund firm's decision about whether to publicly identify one or more fund managers is an ex ante decision about who will own the fund's track record-a valuable asset within the money management industry. Using Morningstar manager name data for 1993-2004, we classify funds as sole-managed, co-managed, or anonymously managed. 3 With respect to the costs and benefits of sharing credit, we expect co-management to be a distinct intermediate step between naming a single manager and anonymous management.
Our analysis consists of two parts. We first conduct cross-sectional tests to understand the marketing and performance benefits and the rent-sharing costs of naming fund managers. We then conduct differences-in-differences tests to understand whether differential shifts in these tradeoffs in specific asset classes and local labor markets were accompanied by differential shifts in credit sharing. We find strong evidence of a marketing benefit to credit sharing, but only weak evidence of a performance benefit.
To test whether naming managers generates marketing benefits, we study the determinants of both media mentions and net flows. Extending the analysis of media mentions in Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) , we find that anonymously-managed funds receive significantly fewer media mentions than comparable sole-managed or co-managed funds. For example, the New York Times "Investing With" column, which profiled a different mutual fund each Sunday, is most likely to feature sole-managed funds, and more likely to feature co-managed funds than anonymously-managed funds. Given the existing evidence that media mentions impact fund flows (Sirri and Tufano (1998) ; Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) ; Kaniel, Starks, and Vasudevan (2007) ), the additional media mentions received by named-manager funds should translate into additional flows into named-manager funds. Indeed, when we examine the determinants of monthly net flows, we find that named-manager funds receive annualized net flows that are approximately 2 percent of assets higher. For funds marketed and sold directly to investors (no-load funds), this effect is predictably larger-about 3 percent of assets per year, even after controlling for the extra media mentions.
To understand whether sharing credit has performance effects that would justify these higher inflows, we study mutual fund returns. Within our sample of domestic equity funds covering 1994-2004, the returns of sole-managed and anonymously-managed funds differ by less than 4 basis points per monthwhether measured as net returns, one-factor alphas, or four factor alphas-and none of the differences are statistically significant. Our inability to reject the hypothesis that named-manager and anonymouslymanaged funds earn the same after-expense return suggests that the additional flows into named-manager funds reflect perceived quality differences (from marketing) rather than actual quality differences.
Nevertheless, returns are sufficiently noisy that economically meaningful performance differences may exist.
To reduce the effects of this noise, we examine components of returns less likely to be affected by it.
First, we follow Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2006, hereafter KSZ) and decompose funds' pre-expense returns into the returns of their most recently disclosed portfolio
Morningstar is much more consistent, especially after 1996, while CRSP often fails to capture manager names that are disclosed in both Morningstar and the filings (see Appendix).
holdings and the remainder, which KSZ term the "return gap." By construction, the return gap is positive when a fund's actual portfolio return exceeds its prior holdings' return, reflecting "unobserved actions"
such as profitable short-term trading activity or intra-family transfers. KSZ show that return gap is more persistent than overall fund returns and is more predictive of future returns. We find that named-manager funds have return gaps that are about 4 basis points per month more positive than anonymously-managed funds.
This difference could reflect named managers' greater effort or skill in short-term trading, but we conduct two further tests that suggest it is at least partly related to within-family favoritism. First, we find that return gap differences between anonymous and named-manager funds exist primarily within fund families and that families with more named managers do not have significantly higher returns across any of our measures. Second, we test for two specific forms of favoritism and, in both cases, find evidence consistent with families favoring named managers. Specifically, extending the analysis of Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) , we find that sole-managed domestic equity funds receive more favorable allocations of shares in underpriced initial public offerings than either co-managed or anonymously-managed funds.
Moreover, we find that sole-managed international equity funds experienced less return dilution from market timing and late trading (Zitzewitz, 2006) . Again, we find that these differences exist primarily within rather than between fund families. To the extent that higher returns of named manager funds are driven by favoritism that lowers the returns of anonymous managed funds, they do not reflect a net benefit to the firm's investors. Thus, whereas the evidence for a marketing benefit of naming managers in our setting is strong, the evidence for any incentive or selection benefit is substantially weaker.
Offsetting the benefits of naming managers are the expected costs from rent sharing. We hypothesize that successful named managers benefit from greater bargaining power, because investors give them a greater share of the credit for the success of their funds. Lacking manager wage data, we provide two alternative sets of tests. The first examine whether successful funds experience lower inflows if a named manager departs, finding evidence that they do.
The second test examines whether increases in managerial bargaining power make naming managers less attractive. Specifically, we examine the seven-fold increase in the size of the hedge fund industry between 1994 and 2004, which created lucrative outside employment opportunities for successful fund managers. To the extent that the hedge fund boom increased the outside opportunities of successful named mutual fund managers more than successful but anonymous managers, it should have raised the expected rent sharing costs to mutual fund firms of naming their managers.
The hedge fund boom coincided with the shift to anonymous management, but need not be related.
Our tests, therefore, take a differences-in-differences approach: we ask whether the shift to anonymity was especially fast in asset classes and geographies in which hedge fund asset growth was especially pronounced. We find that it was. For example, the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, a global macro hedge fund, in 1998 contributed to the sharp decline of internationally-oriented hedge assets from 28 percent of total hedge fund assets in 1997 to 4 percent in 2000. Consistent with this decline differentially reducing the outside opportunities of named international fund managers, we find the shift to anonymity slowed substantially more in that asset class.
Collectively, our findings are consistent with firms weighing the expected marketing benefits of named management against the expected rent sharing costs. Further evidence that we have captured the key tradeoff comes from interviews with the firms themselves conducted at the beginning of the project.
When we asked industry participants to explain the rise of anonymity in Table 1 , the answer was that "fund management always involves more than one person" and thus "team management is primarily about what you tell the outside world." Anticipating some of our main results, one CEO told us that "stars are good for marketing, especially with retail investors, ... but [named] managers are more expensive to pay." Providing support for our argument that successful named managers are more valuable to hedge funds, several industry participants also confirmed that a named manager, especially one who has been promoted in the media, can more readily attract hedge fund assets than an anonymous manager at an equally successful fund.
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Our paper contributes to both the mutual fund literature and a broader literature on employee contracting and career concerns. We make three contributions to the mutual fund literature. First, we provide new evidence on mutual fund product differentiation and (indirectly) on the question of how high fees can coexist with many competitors. The sole-managed funds in our sample receive more media attention and higher flows, despite charging significantly higher fees. When investors face significant search costs and choose to consider only a subset of funds (e.g., Hortascu and Syverson (2004) ), a named manager may provide a "story" that helps distinguish the fund from its peers. Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005) provide related evidence that flows respond disproportionately to mutual fund name changes, while Jain and Wu (2000) and Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks (2007) provide evidence that advertising directly influences fund flows.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the strategic behavior of mutual fund families (Khorana and Servaes (1999); Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) ; Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) ; Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) ). The fact that flows into sole-manager funds are the most sensitive to returns gives firms an incentive to favor these funds, even at the expense of their other funds. Our evidence that solemanaged funds have significantly higher return gaps, greater holdings of underpriced IPOs, and less return dilution from stale price arbitrage are consistent with favoritism by families along a previously unexplored dimension. Collectively, this literature demonstrates that families can play significant roles in the performance of their funds, with important implications for the evaluation of mutual fund performance.
Finally, our study relates to a small recent literature on team management and mutual fund returns. Prather and Middleton (2002) , Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) , and Bliss, Potter, and Schwarz (2006) compare the performance of sole-managed funds to multi-manager funds, a category that combines co-managed and anonymously-managed funds, and find that multi-manager funds underperform by between 0 to 4 basis points per month. In the analysis closest to our own, Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2005) compare the returns of sole-managed funds to anonymously-managed funds, dropping co-managed funds from their sample. Using CRSP manager name data (instead of Morningstar) and a slightly shorter sample period, they find that anonymously-managed funds underperform sole-managed funds by approximately 5 basis points per month. 5 All these papers differ from ours in that they interpret their results as informative about team production, rather than about the relationship between returns and a variable that interviews tell us reflects "what [firms] tell the outside world."
More generally, we contribute to the career concerns and optimal contracting literature by highlighting that the decision to share credit with employees is an important dimension along which firms and employees can contract. This literature includes theoretical and empirical work on asset ownership and hold-up (Williamson, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Joskow, 1985) , asset ownership and incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker and Hubbard, 2003; Simester and Wernerfeldt, 2005) and career concerns (Holmstrom, 1999; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999) . We extend this literature by considering the marketing effects of credit sharing, which are potentially important in other contexts. One literature that has touched on them is on the economics of superstars (Rosen (1981 ), Terviö (2007 ). For example, Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that CEOs who win media awards and become "superstars" earn higher compensation, but that their firms subsequently underperform. In contrast, we find that named-manager funds earn (weakly) higher returns for their investors and attract more inflows for their firms but are, nonetheless, becoming less common over our sample period. An important difference between CEOs and fund managers is that CEOs arguably have more discretion about whether to promote themselves as stars, and thus CEO stardom may be less an outcome of optimal contracting than a symptom of suboptimal contracting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we sketch a simple model that motivates our empirical analysis. In Section II, we detail the mutual fund and hedge fund data used in our 5 Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2005) also examine the relation between anonymous management and inflows and portfolio turnover, finding results that differ from ours. We discuss possible explanations for the differences below.
analysis. In Section III, we study the marketing benefits, incentive benefits and rent sharing costs of naming managers: III.A. presents evidence that media mentions and investor flows favor named manager funds; III.B. explores return differences between named-manager and anonymously-managed funds;
III.C. presents evidence that the bargaining power of named managers increases following periods of good relative performance; III.D. provides evidence that the use of anonymous management rises with hedge fund assets. In Section IV, we discuss a recent Securities and Exchange Commission rule requiring mutual funds to disclose the identities of their fund managers and offer concluding remarks.
I. The Setting
The decision whether to name a fund's managers is a decision about asset ownership, namely, who should own the fund's track record. Embedding this decision in a simple contracting model helps to motivate our empirical analysis. Assume that a manager works for two periods. Before the first period, the firm and manager contract on a first-period wage and on whether the manager will be publicly credited for her performance. After first period returns are realized, the firm and the manager negotiate a second period contract. In both periods, the firm can commit to take it or leave it offers. Both the manager's secondperiod outside option and her second-period value to the firm increase in her first-period performance.
Naming a manager increases her second-period value to the firm (via either marketing or incentive effects), but also increases her outside option. As labor market competition grows more intense, we assume that the second-period outside option increases relatively more for named and successful managers.
In this setup, expected joint surplus is maximized when the manager is named. If the manager has no second-period outside options, then the firm will credit the manager and make the lowest wage offer that induces participation, perhaps offering a performance bonus to create incentives for effort. As the manager's outside options improve, however, retaining her when successful becomes more costly, especially if she is named. It is likely that the firm will be unable to extract all of the expected cost of retaining a named manager in first-period wage bargaining (e.g., due to managerial risk aversion or limited liability). For modest levels of outside labor market competition, incentives provided by secondperiod bargaining power will simply substitute for incentives provided by a performance bonus, and thus will not affect the attractiveness of naming the manager. At some point, however, retaining successful named managers will become expensive enough that the firm will switch to anonymous management. and 1996, however, is limited by the smaller number of funds and smaller fraction of co-managed funds 6 Using either data source, a small portion of the increase in team management is associated with index funds. Therefore, to avoid confusing the determinants of anonymous management with the determinants of indexing, in the analysis that follows, we either include an index fund dummy variable or limit our sample to actively-managed funds. Since CRSP does not identify passively-managed (index) funds, we identify index funds as funds whose name does not contain the word index, the name of a major index, or some abbreviation thereof. We also categorized the articles into three groups: articles making general investment recommendations (e.g., "Best Funds to Buy Now"), articles on a specific investment theme (e.g., "Four Great Energy
II. The Data
Funds") and articles about a particular fund or firm (e.g., "Magellan's Driven Boss"). Data on monthly fund family advertising expenditures were purchased from Competitive Media Research (CMR) and are used in our analysis of media mentions. CMR tracks advertising by firm and outlet, using its knowledge of published advertising rates and likely discounts to estimate spending. The media mention and advertising data cover the years 1996 to 2002 and are described in more detail in Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) .
Data on monthly fund returns come from CRSP. We construct our prior-period holdings return and return gap variables using the procedure outlined in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2006) 
III. Empirical Results
We begin by testing for marketing benefits of sharing credit, in particular whether named-manager funds receive extra media coverage and inflows (III.A.). Next, we test for performance benefits of sharing credit, by examining fund returns and their components (III.B.). To shed light on ex post bargaining power, we explore the extent to which inflows fall when successful named managers depart (III.C.).
Finally, since the growth of the hedge fund industry should have (exogenously) increased the ex post bargaining power of successful named managers, we test whether the shift to anonymous management is greater in those asset classes and geographical areas more affected by the hedge fund boom (III.D.).
A. Named Managers, the Media, and Investor Demand
Sharing credit with employees may benefit firms through increased media attention. In our setting, the financial media both informs and persuades potential investors. For example, Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) show that media mentions can significantly increase flows into mutual funds. To the extent that the financial media prefers to write-or its readership prefers to read-articles about named managers, families with named-manager funds can expect to benefit. To explore this possibility, we extend Reuter and Zitzewitz's analysis of the determinants of media mentions and ask whether anonymously-managed funds are less likely to receive mentions than their sole-managed and comanaged peers. specification predicting a positive mention in any of the five publications. The unit of observation is fund i in month t and the sample period is January 1996 through November 2002. In addition to dummy variables for whether a fund is anonymously managed or co-managed, these regressions control for expense ratios; 12b-1 fees; portfolio turnover; fund returns, return volatility, and inflows over the prior 12 months; the natural logarithm of lagged fund and family assets; fund age; the number of stars awarded to the fund by Morningstar in December of the prior year; and an indicator variable for whether the fund charges a sales commission (load). 7 Magazine mentions are treated as having occurred in the month prior to the issue month and all independent variables are lagged to ensure that no post-mention data is used in their construction.
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To control for variation in the popularity of different asset classes at different times (and the fact that not every publication mentions mutual funds in every month), each regression includes a fixed effect for each investment objective-month combination. Given the finding of Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) that advertising influences mentions in some of these publications, we also control for total and ownpublication print advertising expenditure over the prior 12 months. Standard errors are clustered on mutual fund family.
We find that anonymously-managed funds are less likely to receive positive media mentions than both sole-managed funds (the omitted category) and co-managed funds. The coefficients on the anonymous management dummy are negative in all six specifications and statistically significant from zero in five of the six. Furthermore, in five of the specifications, the coefficient on the anonymous management dummy is less than the coefficient on the co-managed dummy, and in four of these cases, we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal (with p-values ranging from 0.005 to 0.035).
Collectively, these results strongly suggest that the media favors named-manager funds over anonymously-managed funds. Moreover, since it should be more difficult for a journalist to identify and interview anonymous managers, it seems plausible that the differences we document are causal.
With respect to differences between co-management and sole-management, the coefficient on the comanagement dummy is negative and statistically significant in four of the six specifications. In other words, we find that the publications prefer sole-managed funds to co-managed funds and co-managed funds to anonymously-managed funds. These findings reinforce our view that co-management is a distinct intermediate step between naming a single manager and keeping the management team anonymous.
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A comparison of the coefficients on the anonymously-managed dummy variable to the coefficients on other variables reveals that the preference for named-manager funds is economically significant. For instance, relative to being sole-managed, being anonymously managed reduces the likelihood of a positive mention in any of the five publications (column 6) by about half as much as being a load fund, or by almost as much as receiving one star (the lowest possible rating) from Morningstar. Coefficients on the other variables, including own-publication advertising, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) . In particular, we find that the probability of a positive mention is increasing in lagged returns, flows, fund size, and Morningstar ratings, and higher for no-load funds.
As robustness checks, we estimate several additional probit regressions. For example, one might expect anonymously-managed funds to be mentioned less in articles profiling a particular fund or family.
In unreported results, we find this to be the case. 10 On the other hand, we also find that anonymouslymanaged funds are also less likely to receive negative mentions. This is a smaller advantage than it might seem, however, because positive mentions in our sample of publications outnumber negative mentions by a factor of about eight. Finally, consistent with evidence in Mullainathan and Shleifer (2006) that investor demand for mutual fund information changes between bull and bear markets, when we estimate the probit regression in the last column of Table 2 separately for each year between 1997 to 2002, we find that the preference for named-manager funds peaked between 1998 and 2000 (as measured by either the absolute or relative size of the coefficient on the anonymous management dummy variable). 11 In other words, the media appears to have been more interested in writing about named-manager funds during the stock market boom of the late 1990s. As this interest declined, so did the media benefit of named managers.
Of course, the marketing benefits of named managers may not be limited to increased media mentions. If investors face search costs and consider only a subset of funds (e.g., Hortascu and Syverson (2004) ), a named manager may provide a fund with a "story" that helps differentiate it from its peers, resulting in more dollars under management and higher fees. 12 Alternatively, investors might avoid anonymously-managed funds, perceiving them to have lower quality, less motivated managers.
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Therefore, in Table 3 , we turn from probit regressions predicting media mentions to linear panel regressions predicting monthly net flows. These regressions allow us to test whether flows into namedmanager funds differ systematically from flows into anonymously-managed funds-both before and after controlling for the impact of media mentions. The unit of analysis is, again, fund i in month t. For the purposes of this analysis, we restrict our sample to the 99.84% of observations with continuously compounded monthly flows between -100% and 100%, and we include the same control variables as in Table 2 . In particular, we continue to include fixed effects for each investment objective-month combination, so that we are effectively measuring each fund's flow relative to the average level of flow within the same investment objective and month. Standard errors cluster on month.
14 Within our full sample of funds, we find that anonymously-managed funds receive monthly net flows 16.5 basis points lower than those received by comparable sole-manager funds (column (1)). 15 However, this estimate masks significant heterogeneity across mutual fund distribution channels. When we follow
Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2006) and estimate separate specifications for no-load funds (column (2)) and load funds (column (3)), we find that anonymity has a greater impact on flows for those funds marketed and sold directly to investors. The difference between sole-managed and anonymously managed is 24.3 basis points per month for no-load funds versus 9.3 basis points for load funds.
Regardless, in all three specifications, we can reject the hypotheses (at the 10-percent level or below) that net flows into anonymously managed equal those into sole-managed or co-managed funds. We view this as further evidence that anonymous management is distinct from co-management.
In the remaining columns, we attempt to determine how much of the lower flows into anonymouslymanaged funds can be explained by the media's preference for named managers. To do so, we restrict our sample to 1997-2002, when we possess data on both Morningstar ratings and media mentions. Columns (4)-(6) include the same control variables as before; columns (7)-(9) add lagged Morningstar ratings and media mentions. Adding the additional controls reduces the coefficient on anonymous management by approximately 20%, suggesting that an economically significant fraction-but certainly not all-of the additional flows into no-load funds are associated with media mentions. In other words, it appears that perceived quality differences between named-manager and anonymously-managed funds significantly impact fund flows.
As a final robustness check on the media and flow results, we re-estimate specifications using instrumental variables techniques. Decisions about managerial anonymity are correlated at the firm level;
firm fixed effects alone explain about 38 percent of the variation in anonymity. 16 To the extent that prior firm-level decisions about anonymous management are exogenous to unobserved current-period, fund-14 Inferences are similar when we cluster standard errors on fund, cluster standard errors on both fund and month, or use the procedure outlined in Fama and MacBeth (1973) to estimate coefficients and standard errors. 15 Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2005) conduct a related analysis, finding higher flows into anonymously-managed funds than into sole-managed funds. We are able to replicate their sign and approximate magnitude by using the CRSP manager data and adopting their specification, which omits objective-time fixed effects. Adding time fixed effects alone to their specification is sufficient to flip the sign back to being consistent with our results. This suggests that the source of difference in our results may be that Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi are partly identifying their regression from time series trends in anonymity and average fund-level flows. 16 A plausible reason was given by one of our industry interviewees, who argued that having star managers and anonymous teams in the same organization was "culturally incompatible. " Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2005) also find correlations in anonymity within families in the CRSP data.
level variation in investors' appetite for anonymous or named management, we can use the latter as an instrument for the (lagged) anonymous management dummy variable. For both inflow and media mentions, instrumental variable specifications yield coefficients on the anonymously-managed dummy that are similar to those obtained via OLS, suggesting that families' decisions to use anonymous management are uncorrelated with the unobserved characteristics that affect their attractiveness to investors or the media. In general, Hausman tests do not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 17 Given this fact, we do not report the IV results. Overall, the results in this section lead us to conclude that named managers benefit their firms through increased media mentions and, especially in the case of noload funds, increased flows beyond those implied by the increased media attention.
B. Named Managers and Fund Performance
Finding that named-manager funds benefit from additional media attention and inflows, we next ask whether these benefits are justified by higher expected returns. To the extent that anonymous management results in less skilled or less motivated managers, investors' preference for named-manager funds may be rational. In the first three columns of Panel A of Table 4 , we restrict our sample to activelymanaged domestic equity funds and use panel regressions to test for differences in the net (after-expense) and risk-adjusted returns of sole-managed, co-managed, and anonymously-managed funds. The set of control variables and fixed effects mirror Table 3 , except that in columns (2) and (3), we replace lagged net returns with lagged one-factor and four-factor alphas, respectively. Standard errors cluster on month.
Using classifications based on the Morningstar manager name variable, we find weak evidence of return differences; coefficients on the anonymously-managed dummy range from -0.7 to -3.4 basis points per month, but are not statistically significant even at the 20-percent level. 18 However, in columns (4) and (5), we find that anonymously-managed funds have significantly lower expense ratios and portfolio 17 The one exception is for inflows into load funds, where our IV coefficient loses statistical significance, and the Hausman test statistic has a p-value near 0.10. 18 Prather and Middleton (2002), Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) , and Bliss, Potter, and Schwarz (2006) study the performance of sole-managed funds relative to multi-manager funds, a category which lumps co-managed funds together with anonymously-managed funds. Using samples that differ in terms of time periods, types of funds studied, and whether they use manager name variables from CRSP or Morningstar, these papers find that multimanager funds underperform sole-managed funds by between 0 and 4 basis points per month. When we replace our anonymously-managed and co-managed dummies with a non-sole-managed dummy, and re-estimate specifications (1), (2), and (3), the coefficients on the multi-manager dummy are -0.7 (p-value of 0.626), -1.9 (p-value of 0.198), and -2.5 (p-value of 0.062) basis points per month. Here, as in Table 4 , return differences are higher for alphas rather than raw returns because anonymous-(and multi-) manager funds have slightly higher betas and 1994-2004 was a time period in which the market outperformed cash. Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2005) compare anonymous teammanaged funds and sole-managed funds, as classified by CRSP. Their estimated differences are larger, ranging from 5.0 basis points per month, in a univariate comparison of net returns, to 5.6 basis points per month, in a multivariate analysis of four-factor alphas.
turnover than other funds within the same investment objectives and month. 19 The higher expense ratios on sole-manager funds are interesting for two reasons. First, they are consistent with sole-managers generating higher revenues for their firms through increased product differentiation. Second, to the extent that sole-managed funds earn the same net returns as anonymously-managed funds, they do so despite having expense ratios that are almost 1.5 basis points higher per month.
To shed further light on the link between returns and management status we turn to a measure of performance that captures the "unobserved actions" of managers. Specifically, we follow Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2006) and decompose net returns into expense ratios, the gross returns implied by prior holdings, and the remainder, which KSZ refer to as the "return gap."
Since we possess matched U.S. equity holdings data for 1994 to 2002, we are able to estimate monthly prior holding returns and monthly return gaps for the set of actively-managed domestic equity funds over this period (taking care to adjust the prior holdings return for a fund's non-stock holdings). 20 In the first three columns of Panel B, our dependent variables are fund i's net (after-expense) return, the predicted return based on its prior holdings, and its return gap. (We continue to include but do not report coefficients for the control variables.)
We find, in column (8), that anonymously-managed funds exhibit more negative return gaps than sole-managed funds. By this less noisy measure of before-expense performance, anonymously-managed funds underperform named-manager funds by 3.6 basis points per month-approximately 43 basis points per year-and the difference is statistically significant at the 1-percent level. Moreover, we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the anonymously-managed and co-managed dummies are equal at the 10-percent level (p-value of 0.063). These findings suggest that, once we isolate a component of returns that past work (KSZ (2006)) has shown to be persistent, we find some evidence that anonymous managed funds underperform.
What explains the lower return gaps of anonymously-managed funds? As KSZ discuss, a negative return gap can have multiple sources. For example, funds with negative return gaps may do more trading, paying higher transaction costs in the form of trading commissions or price impact. However, we have 19 We classify Potomac, ProFunds, and Rydex funds as specialized domestic equity funds, thereby excluding them from the analysis in Tables 4 and 5 . These funds have exceptionally high portfolio turnover (approximately 20 times the average fund in our sample) and, beginning in 1999, tend to be anonymously team managed. Including these funds changes the sign on the coefficient on the anonymously managed dummy in the analysis of turnover from negative to positive (which makes it consistent with a similar regression in Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2005)) but does not otherwise alter our results. 20 When a fund invests less than 100 percent of its portfolio in common stock, we assume that its non-stock holdings earn the risk-free rate of return (as reported on Kenneth French's website). To the extent that funds hold long-term bonds instead of cash, this assumption is imprecise. Fortunately, according to the CRSP database, the bond holdings of non-specialized domestic equity funds are small (less than 1 percent of assets on average), and the assumption only biases our tests to the extent that anonymously managed funds hold a different mix of bonds than namedmanager funds within the same investment objective and month.
already seen that anonymously-managed funds have lower portfolio turnover. In addition, when we study the number of stocks that funds report holding at fiscal year ends (column (10)), we find that anonymously-managed funds hold less concentrated portfolios, which also suggests less active management. Less active management of anonymously managed funds is consistent with Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) , who find that multi-manager funds (team and co-managed funds taken together) face more investment restrictions. The lower returns we find for anonymously managed funds, therefore, do not appear to be the result of higher transaction costs arising from active management.
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If anonymously-managed funds trade less than named-manager funds, what explains the negative return gap? One possible explanation is that anonymously-managed funds benefit less from favoritism than named-manager funds (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2006) . Preliminary evidence of favoritism comes from the fact that adding family-month fixed effects to the return gap regression (column (9) of Table 4) reveals that the named versus anonymous difference is slightly larger within families (5.6 basis points per point) than it is between families, which lends support to the hypothesis that named-manager funds enjoy more favoritism, permit less return diversion, or both.
To test the hypothesis that named managers permit less return diversion in their funds, we ask whether anonymously-managed international funds suffered more dilution due to stale price arbitrage and late trading. Following Zitzewitz (2006) , we use Lipper and TrimTabs daily flow data to calculate monthly dilution rates for the period 2000 to 2003. We find that the average (univariate) impact of fund arbitrage on returns is 9.2 basis points per month in anonymously-managed funds but only 3.3 basis points per month in named-manager funds. In columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 , we report coefficients from pooled regressions that control for fund characteristics. Without the family-month fixed effects, we find that the coefficient on the anonymously-managed dummy implies 2.7 basis points more dilution per month than in sole-managed funds (significant at the 1-percent level). Adding family-month fixed effects, the coefficient increases to 6.1 basis points per month, which suggests that families with a mixture of anonymously-managed and named-manager funds were more willing to permit dilution from stale price arbitrage in their anonymously-managed funds.
As a second test of the favoritism hypothesis, we ask whether IPO allocations differ across namedmanager and anonymously-managed funds. To the extent that named managers have more ability or incentive to ensure they receive IPO allocations, we expect named-manager funds to receive more and more valuable IPO allocations. In Table 5 Finally, we attempt to quantity the impact of IPO allocations on fund returns. The dependent variable in column (4) is the ratio of the total underpricing that we estimate fund i earned over the past quarter based on reported holdings at quarter end to the fund i's end-of-quarter TNA. This variable is positive when the fund is estimated to have earned positive underpricing on its IPO holdings, negative when it is estimated to have earn negative underpricing on its IPO holdings, and zero when the fund does not report holding shares of any recent IPOs. We estimate the coefficients in column (4) via OLS. The negative coefficient on the anonymously-managed dummy indicates that anonymously-managed funds receive less of a boost to their performance from underpriced IPOs than do sole-managed or co-managed funds, but the implied difference in performance is 0.46 basis points per quarter, suggesting that favorable IPO allocations are but one source of the return gap differences of roughly 4 basis points per month.
Taken as a whole, the results in this section demonstrate both that anonymously-managed funds earn slightly lower returns than their named-manager peers and that these lower returns, reflect, at least in part, less favorable IPO allocations and more return dilution from stale price arbitrage. It remains unclear, however, whether these differences reflect the greater bargaining power of named managers within their fund families or strategic behavior by fund families to favor named-manager funds for marketing reasons.
C. Bargaining Power and the Cost of Naming Managers
While the above evidence points to several potential benefits of using named managers, their declining prevalence suggests that using named managers is not costless. In this section, we ask whether named managers enjoy increased bargaining power following periods of good performance. Ideally, if we observed wages for both named and anonymous fund managers, we could directly measure the additional costs of retaining successful named managers. Unfortunately, fund manager wage data are not publicly available and have proven impossible to obtain. We can, however, draw an inference about managerial bargaining power from changes in the flow-performance relation when named managers depart.
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In Table 6 , we extend our earlier analysis of monthly net flows by controlling for the departure of named managers. In column (1), we replace the fund's net returns over the prior 12 months with its within-objective performance ranking over the prior 12 months; this ranking equals zero for the worst performing fund within the objective and one for the best. 23 We also add a dummy variable indicating whether any named managers departed during the prior 12 months. (By construction, the named manager turnover variable is zero for anonymously-managed funds.) To determine whether flows into anonymously managed and co-managed funds are less sensitive to return rankings, we interact the return ranking with the anonymously managed and co-managed dummy variables, respectively. To shed light on the bargaining power of successful named managers, we interact the return ranking with the named manager turnover dummy. Column (2) adds controls for the fund's past returns, past returns squared, and within-objective rank squared.
In both specifications, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between within-objective return ranking and named manager turnover suggests that the inflows generated by better performance are attenuated when one or more named manager departs soon thereafter. The fact that a successful named manager's departure reduces fund inflows suggests that successful named managers have greater bargaining power with their firms. This, in turn, implies that named managers should earn more of the rents accruing to good performance.
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Because we cannot observe the departure of anonymous managers, we cannot perform similar tests on the interaction between return ranking and an anonymous manager turnover dummy. Therefore, to conclude that the reduction in flows is lower surrounding the turnover of successful anonymous managers, we must assume that the lack of manager names in Morningstar and SEC filings makes it difficult for retail investors to identify these departures. Since firms should have no incentive to identify departures in these cases, we find this assumption to be quite reasonable.
D. Hedge Fund Competition and the Anonymous Management of Mutual Funds
According to several industry participants we interviewed, competition from the hedge fund industry for managers with strong track records increased substantially over the past decade. Since anonymous managers receive fewer reputational benefits from a fund's track record, anonymity should reduce their opportunities with prospective employers, especially when they are successful. 25 Therefore, to the extent that the hedge fund boom differentially increased outside opportunities for successful named managers, it should have increased the costs associated with naming managers and led to more anonymous management. In this section, we test whether the use of anonymous management is greater in those asset classes and geographical areas with more hedge fund assets.
While the overall growth in hedge fund assets has been close to monotonic, Table 7 (using data from Getmansky, Lo, and Wei (2004)) reveals that the growth rates of different asset classes have varied 24 Within a sample of sole-managed equity and bond funds, Khorana (2001) finds that fund performance increases when managers depart following periods of below-average performance and decreases when managers depart following periods of above-average performance. Lynch and Musto (2003) find that investors are less likely to withdraw money from a poorly performing fund when they anticipate that the fund will adopt a new strategy. This complements our finding in Table 6 that investors' inflows suggest they expect good performance to be less persistent when a named manager departs. 25 In the context of mutual fund prospectuses and advertising, managers can only take credit for the track record of a prior fund if the management teams, investment objectives, and strategies of the new and old funds are essentially unchanged. When discussing the precedent set by an SEC No-Action Letter (dated August 7, 1996) to the Bramwell Growth Fund, Pierce (1999) states that "it would be difficult to rely on Bramwell to use the performance record of a fund that is run by a committee or by a portfolio manager whose discretion is limited by supervisory approval or other controls" (p. Table 7 suggest that competition from the hedge fund industry should have peaked for different mutual fund asset classes at different times.
In Table 8 , we exploit within-time-period, cross-sectional variation in manager bargaining power, brought about by the hedge fund boom, to predict variation in the use of anonymous management. We start by testing whether funds are more likely to use anonymous teams when same-category hedge fund assets are higher. The independent variable of interest in columns (1) and (2) is the natural logarithm of hedge fund assets in the same broad investment objective as fund i, where hedge fund assets are measured at the end of the prior calendar year. In addition to our standard set of control variables, we include a separate fixed effect for each investment objective and for each family-year pair. The inclusion of time period fixed effects ensures that identification comes from cross-sectional variation across hedge fund asset classes-caused, for example, by the collapse in demand for internationally-oriented hedge funds after LTCM failed in 1998-rather than time-series variation in the overall size of the hedge fund industry. Column (2) controls for lagged management status, while column (1) does not. Standard errors adjust for clustering within objective-year.
In both specifications, the coefficients on same-category hedge fund assets are positive and statistically significant (at the 1-percent and 5-percent levels), lending support to the hypothesis that the shift to anonymous mutual fund management was faster in asset classes experiencing faster hedge fund growth. 26 These findings also lend support to our more general hypothesis that mutual funds weigh the expected ex post bargaining costs of successful managers when deciding whether to use named or anonymous managers.
To shed further light on this general hypothesis, we ask whether the move toward anonymous management was more pronounced in geographic areas with more overlap between mutual funds and hedge funds, under the assumption that these are the areas where labor market competition for successful fund managers should be strongest. Data from TASS on the business addresses of hedge funds suggest that the U.S. hedge fund industry is quite concentrated near New York City, with New York state, 26 Most other observables are close to uncorrelated with anonymity. One interesting exception is fund size; anonymously managed funds are smaller than otherwise similar funds in the same family. In contrast, in unreported results we find that co-managed funds are larger than either sole or anonymously managed funds, consistent with the finding of Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) that families add managers to growing funds. This provides further evidence that anonymous management is distinct from co-management.
Connecticut, and New Jersey accounting for 55, 7, and 3 percent of total assets during our time period.
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Hand-collected data on mutual fund family locations from the Nelson Directory of Investment Managers reveals that the mutual fund industry is concentrated in Boston and New York, with these cities accounting for 24% and 16%, respectively, of the mutual funds assets in our sample.
In columns (3) and (4), we test whether mutual funds in states with more hedge fund assets are more likely to adopt anonymous management. The new variable of interest is the natural logarithm of hedge fund assets in the same state as fund i, again measured at the end of the prior calendar year. Since this variable varies at the state-year level we are able to include fixed effects for each objective-year pair and for each family; we also cluster standard errors on state-year. The resulting coefficients on same-state hedge fund assets are positive and statistically significant (again, at 1-percent and 5-percent levels), confirming our prediction that the shift to anonymity should have been relatively faster in those states with faster hedge fund asset growth.
Since most hedge fund assets are located in Boston and New York City, as a robustness check, we focus on the use of anonymous teams in these cities. We include dummy variables indicating whether fund i is located in Boston or New York City, and we interact these city dummy variables with the natural logarithm of hedge fund assets at the end of the prior calendar year. These specifications include objective-year fixed effects and their standard errors cluster on mutual fund family.
The coefficients on the Boston and New York City dummies are negative and statistically significant (at the 10-percent level and below) in both columns. This suggests that, everything else equal, mutual fund families headquartered in Boston and New York City are less likely to use anonymous management.
However, consistent with our hypothesis that the use of anonymous teams is related to the level of hedge fund assets, we find that the coefficients on our lagged hedge fund asset-city interaction terms are positive and statistically significant (at the 10-percent level and below). For example, the coefficient on the New York City interaction term in column (5) implies that the incremental probability of a New York Citybased fund reporting anonymous management increased from 3.5 percent in 1996 to 14.4 percent in 2002.
Collectively, the results in Table 8 suggest that the move towards anonymous management by mutual funds was strongest in those asset classes and locations with the most hedge fund assets. It is worth reiterating that these results are not driven by general time series trends. Rather, because we include time period fixed effects, we follow a standard differences-in-differences approach and identify off of crosssectional differences in the growth of hedge funds in different asset classes or geographical areas. When we remove the time period fixed effects and use the overall level of hedge fund assets for identification, our results get much stronger.
The various coefficients in Table 8 imply that the seven-fold growth of the hedge fund industry should have explained 10 to 40 percent of the 14 percentage point increase in managerial anonymity reported in Table 1 . This leaves room for alternative explanations of the remainder. One possibility might be the decline in the media preference for named-manager funds after 2000 mentioned earlier.
Another alternative is that the norm of anonymity might have been imported from the hedge fund industry, where arguably less attention is given to managers. It is also possible that long-only inefficiencies have gotten smaller in the last decade, making it more difficult to become a star mutual fund manager. Indeed, consistent with this idea, we find evidence (in unreported regressions) that equity and debt mutual fund returns (risk-adjusted or not) have become less persistent over our time period. While these three mechanisms may have contributed to the rise of anonymity in our time period, they are likely to have done so more gradually and uniformly across cities and asset classes. As a result, they do not lend themselves to the sort of differences-in-differences analysis we conduct above, nor would they explain the findings of our analysis in Table 8 .
IV. Conclusion
We use the U.S. mutual fund industry as a laboratory to study the economics of firms sharing credit with employees. We conjecture that firms share credit for project outcomes with employees when the expected marketing and incentive benefits of sharing credit exceed the expected costs of increased employee bargaining power. Within our setting, where manager skill is aggressively marketed but hard to detect, the primary benefits of naming managers arise from additional media mentions and flows. Any evidence of return differences between named-manager and anonymously-managed funds appear to reflect family-level decisions to exploit these marketing benefits. With respect to the added rent-sharing costs of named managers, we find that inflows decline when successful named managers depart.
Consistent with the growth of the hedge fund industry increasing ex post bargaining power more for successful named managers, we also find that the shift to anonymous management is greater in those asset classes and geographical areas with more hedge fund assets. Our findings have ambiguous implications for the question of whether the mandatory disclosure of manager names is beneficial for either the industry or the investing public. To the extent that naming managers results in higher returns, everything else equal, it will benefit investors. The return differences are, however, fairly mild and likely driven by within-family favoritism of named-manager funds.
Consequently, any return benefits of naming formerly anonymous managers-for example in the form of more equitable allocations of IPOs-may come at the expense of less favoritism for their already named colleagues.
On the other hand, we find that naming managers increases the sensitivity of inflows to their retention, which should increase their bargaining power and wages. In addition, naming managers likely increases the differentiation of mutual funds, in that it leads investors to jointly choose firms and managers. To the extent that these effects explain the fact that expense ratios were 17 basis points higher for named-manager funds, they suggest that eliminating anonymity for any given fund could put upward pressure on its expenses. The equilibrium consequences for fund expenses of eliminating all anonymous management are, of course, less clear.
Outside the fund industry, firms also face decisions about whether to share credit with their employees in ways that allow them to develop reputations independent of the firm. Many CEOs develop such reputations, as do some engineers (e.g., Steve Wozniak at Apple) and division heads (e.g. Jamie Dimon while at Citigroup, Carly Fiorina while at Lucent, and Lee Iacocca while at Ford). For some categories of employees (e.g., print journalists) being allowed such a reputation is the norm, albeit one from which some employers deviate (e.g., The Economist). When choosing whether to allow their employees an outside reputation, these firms likely also face the same tradeoff between marketing benefits and retention costs that we document in the context of mutual fund managers.
At the same time, one might expect the incentive effects of employee stardom to differ depending on the alignment between an employee's performance for the firm and what generates stardom. For fund managers, the route to stardom is generating high returns and a media profile, which also generates profits for their employer. For journalists, writing high-impact articles likewise serves both the employer's and employee's interests. In contrast, a stardom-seeking CEO, division manager, or engineer might find that maintaining a public profile is distracting from serving her employer's goals. Sharing credit can be in the firm's interest, but in many cases, firms need to ensure they retain enough credit for themselves.
Appendix. Assessing the Accuracy of CRSP and Morningstar Manager Name Data
As discussed in Section II, we possess manager name variables from both CRSP and Morningstar for the period [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . In this appendix, we compare the Morningstar manager name variable, which retail investors are more likely to rely upon and which we rely upon in our analysis, with the CRSP manager name variable, which Chen et al (2004) , Bär et al (2005) , and other academic studies typically rely upon.
For a random sample of domestic equity funds in 2002, we also compare the Morningstar and CRSP manager name variables to the information disclosed within Prospectuses and Statements of Additional Information.
In Table A1 To more accurately capture the rise in anonymous management, in the last three columns of Table   A1 , we adjust the fraction of sole-managed, co-managed, and anonymously team managed funds for two such regime changes. 30 In Panel A, the drop in the fraction of anonymous management from 16.9% in 1996 to 7.5% in 1997 reflects that the fact that, prior to 1997, Morningstar classified any fund with more than two named managers as "Team Managed," leading us to erroneously classify funds with three or more named managers in the first four years of our sample as anonymously team managed. In the last two 29 When the manager name variable includes one or more manager names and the phrase "Team Managed" we use the number of named managers to classify the fund as sole-managed or co-managed. 30 Note that these adjustments only apply to Table 1 and Table A1 ; the management classification variables used throughout our analysis are constructed from the raw Morningstar manager name variable. to list five or more manager names.) In Panel B, we adjust the fractions of sole-managed, co-managed, and anonymously-managed funds for the fact that CRSP essentially no longer reports firm names in its manager name variable after 1999. Here, we use the distribution of transitions from "Firm Name" to solemanaged (57.2%), co-managed (20.1%), and anonymously-managed (22.7%) between 1993 and 2000 to re-distribute "Firm Name" funds across the three categories.
In Table A2 , we restrict the sample to funds for which we possess both Morningstar and CRSP This reinforces the fact that CRSP tends to misclassify funds with four or more named managers as anonymously team managed.
Our evidence that Morningstar and CRSP both misclassify at least some co-managed funds as anonymously team managed raises a question about the accuracy of either data source. Since our analysis focuses on a mutual fund's decision to name or not name its managers, we want variation in our anonymously team managed dummy variable to be driven by variation in whether the fund discloses manager names to its investors-rather than by variation in the rules that Morningstar and CRSP use to process the manager name data. In all but one case, we were able to locate manager names or a phrase like "The Adviser manages the Funds by an investment team approach" followed by no names. In the one case where we
were not able to locate any explicit discussion of how the fund was managed, we followed both CRSP and Morningstar and classified the fund as anonymously team managed. Table A3 summarizes the findings from this stratified random sample. Overall, we find that Morningstar more accurately captures the content of the filings than does CRSP. In particular, of the 45 funds that CRSP lists as anonymously team managed but that Morningstar does not, we are able to locate one or more manager name for 37 (82.2%) of the funds. In virtually every one of these cases, the filing states that the fund is team managed but goes on to list manager names, providing further evidence that This table reports the percentage of mutual funds classified as reporting one manager name (sole managed), reporting two or more manager names (co-managed), or reporting no manager names (anonymously managed). Since the Morningstar classification likely better reflects the information available to investors, we use the actual values reported by Morningstar in most of our analysis (see Table A1 ). However, to better highlight the rise of anonymously-managed funds, the numbers and percentages in this table are adjusted for time-series changes in the rules that CRSP and Morningstar use to classify a mutual fund's management structure. For the purposes of this table only, in 1993-1996, when Morningstar identified any fund with more than two named managers as anonymous managed, we use the distribution of transitions in management type between 1996-1997 to impute management type in 1993 -1996 . From 1993 , CRSP's manager name variable occasionally reports a firm name rather than a manager name. In this table, we use the distribution of transitions from firm names to sole management, co-management, and anonymous management to adjust the aggregate CRSP statistics. the prior year are used to create five dummy variables (corresponding to ratings between one and five stars). Since Morningstar ratings are awarded at the share class level, these dummy variables are then multiplied by the fraction of fund i's dollars under management that receive each rating. "Family's print advertising to assets ratio (t-12 to t-1)" is defined as family i's total print advertising expenditures between months t-12 and t-1 divided by the average assets under management in family i during the same twelve-month period. "Own publication advertising (t-12 to t-1)" is defined as family j's total advertising expenditure in publication between months t-12 and t-1. We exclude this variable when predicting media mentions in Consumer Reports (which does not accept advertising) and in the set of all five publications. The advertising data were acquired from Competitive Media Research and are described in Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) ; they are measured in millions of dollars. Standard errors are clustered on mutual fund family and are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels (in a two-sided test) is denoted by *, **, and ***.
Adjusted Management Classification

Consumer Reports Positive Media
Positive media mentions
Each column reports coefficients from a probit regression estimated for positive media mentions in a single publication or, in column (6), for a positive media mention in any of the five publications. We include a separate fixed effect for each investment objective each month. "Anonymous team managed (t-12)" is a dummy variable that equals one if Morningstar lists fund i as being managed by unnamed managers in month t-12. "Co-managed (t-12)" is a dummy variable that equals one if Morningstar lists fund i as being managed by multiple named managers in month t-12. Fund characteristics come from CRSP. (Sole-managed funds are the omitted category.) "No Load (t-12)" is a dummy variable that equals one if CRSP lists fund i as charging a sales commission. "Expense ratio (t-12)" and "12b-1 fee (t-12)" are fund's lagged expense ratio and 12b-1 fee.
New York Times Money Magazine Kiplinger's Personal SmartMoney
Log Fund TNA (t-1) and "Log Family TNA (t-1)" are the natural logarithm of dollars under management by fund i and by its family in month t-1. "Turnover (t-12)" is lagged portfolio turnover. "Fund age in years (t)" is the number of years between fund i's inception (according to CRSP) and month t. "Net Returns (t-12 to t-1)" is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the return of fund~i between months t-12 and t-1. "Net Flows (t-12 to t-1)" is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the growth in fund~i's TNA between months t-12 and t-1 minus "Net Returns (t-12 to t-1)". It is the continuously compounded growth in assets minus the continuously compounded net return. Morningstar ratings from December of (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) Note: In this table, we estimate the determinants of monthly net flows in a panel regression with a separate fixed effect for each investment objective each month. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the change in TNA between months t and t+1 minus the natural logarithm of 1 plus the fund's return between months t and t+1, which is the continuously compounded rate of growth in the fund assets minus the continuously compounded monthly return. We limit the sample to the 99.84% of fund-month observations with continuously compounded inflows between -100 percent and +100 percent. The independent variables are defined in the notes to Table 2 . Columns (4) through (6) restrict the sample to 1997-2002, when we possess data on both lagged Morningstar ratings and lagged media mentions. Columns (7) through (9) extend columns (4) through (6) but control for the prior-year's Morningstar ratings and media mentions in NYT, Money, Kiplinger's, SmartMoney, and Consumer Report between months t-11 and t. Standard errors cluster on year-month. Significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels (in a two-sided test) is denoted by *, **, and ***. 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 (1) (2) (3) (4) 1994-2002 1994-2002 1994-2002 1994-2002 1994-2002 (6) (7) (8) ratio, turnover, and number of stock regressions, the unit of observation is fund i in January of year t. Expense ratio and turnover are measured as percentage points per year. The number of stocks is the number of US stocks disclosed in the fund's most recent N-30D filing. All independent variables except fund age are lagged. Specifications focused on monthly returns include S&P investment objective-by-month fixed effects. Specifications (4), (5), and (10) include objective-by-year fixed effects. Specification (9) also includes mutual fund family fixed effects. Standard errors cluster on year-month or year, as appropriate. Significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels (in a two-sided test) is denoted by *, **, and ***.
Month
In this table, we estimate the determinants of monthly returns and fund characteristics in a panel regression with a separate fixed effect for each investment objective each month. We restrict the sample to actively managed, non-specialty domestic equity funds for which we can estimate risk-adjusted returns. Non-Specialized Domestic Equity, 1994 Equity, -2002 This table explores two potential explanations for the lower return gaps of anonymous team-managed funds. In the first three specifications, we focus on dilution due to stale price arbitrage and late trading in international equity funds. Within the small sample of international equity fund-months for which Lipper and TrimTabs daily flow data are available, dilution is calculated as in Zitzewitz (2006) . Estimation is via OLS, includes S&P investment objective-by-month fixed effects, and the full set of control variables from Table 9 ; specification (3) includes mutual fund family fixed effects as well. In the remaining four specifications, we focus on IPO allocations to anonymously team-managed funds. Our sample is restricted to non-specialty domestic equity funds between 1994 and 2002 . Following Reuter (2006 , we construct proxies for IPO allocations from reported holdings of recent IPOs. We consider four (related) measures of the contribution of IPOs to fund performance. The dependent variable in column (4) is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i reported holding shares in any of the IPOs that occured during the past quarter. We estimate the specifications in columns (4) via probit and report marginal effects. The dependent variable in column (5) is the ratio of the value of fund i's holdings of recent IPOs to the fund's end-of-quarter TNA. Since this variable equals zero much of the time and cannot be negative, we estimate the specification in column (5) via Tobit. The dependent variable in column (6) is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i's reported holdings suggest that it earned positive returns from underpricing during the past quarter. We estimate the specifications in columns (6) via probit and report marginal effects. Finally, the dependent variable in column (7) is the ratio of the total underpricing that we estimate fund i earned over the past quarter based on reported holdings at quarter end to the fund's end-of-quarter TNA. Since this variable can be negative, zero, or positive, we estimate specification (7) via OLS; however, we trim the top 1% of the positive and negative values. Standard errors are clustered on fund. Significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels is denoted by *, **, and ***. Table 3 . Return rank ranges from 0, when fund i has the lowest net return within its investment objective between t-12 to t-1, to 1, when it has the highest net return. The hypothesis tests are conducted assuming a return rank of 0.5. Standard errors cluster on year-month. [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] (1) Share by broad category Asset totals by investment category are from the TASS database, as reported by Getmansky, Lo, and Wei (2004) . 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** Fund age (t) -0.001 *** -0.000 -0.001 *** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 ** Net flow (t-12 to t-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 Net return (t-12 to t-1) -0.001 *** -0.000 * -0.001 ** -0.001 *** -0.001 ** -0.000 * Std dev net return (t-12 to t-1) -0. Table 4 , with the goal of testing whether the use of anonymous team management is correlated with growth in the hedge fund industry. The first hedge fund-related variable is the natural logarithm of hedge fund assets in the same broad asset class (i.e., debt, domestic equity, or international equity) as fund i. The second hedge fund-related variable is the natural logarithm of hedge fund assets managed by firms in the same state as fund i. The third set of hedge fund variables are dummy variables indicating whether fund i is located in Boston or NYC plus interactions with the log of total hedge fund industry assets. While the set of fixed effects vary across specifications, all specifications include a full set of year fixed effects. How we cluster the standard errors in each specification is reported in the table. Significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels (in two-sided tests) is denoted by *, **, and ***. 
All All
1994 -2004 1994-2004 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 Levels Changes Levels Changes Levels Changes To determine whether Morningstar or CRSP provided more accurate information on management structure, we hand-collected data on management structure for a sample of domestic equity funds in 2002. Funds were put into four bins based on whether CRSP or Morningstar classified the funds as being anonymously team managed. For the funds chosen at random within each bin, data on the actual management structure were hand-collected from Prospectuses and Statements of Additional Information available on SEC's EDGAR database. In all but one case, we were able to locate manager names or a phrase like "The Adviser manages the Funds by an investment team approach" followed by no names. In the one case where we were not able to locate any explicit discussion of how the fund was managed, we followed both CRSP and Morningstar and classified the fund as anonymously managed.
